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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL JOAN STONE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
VAL FRANKLIN STONE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No 
10698 
Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by a father to modify the terms 
of a divorce decree by changing the custody of four 
minor children from the mother to the father. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Judge of the Third Judicial District, who 
found all issues in favor of the mother, and refused to 
g-rant the change of custody. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the decision of the trial 
1 
court be affirmed, and that respondent be awarded 
reasonable attorney's fees for the expenses of defending 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Carol Joan Stone and Val Franklin Stone were 
married on March 13, 1952. There were four children 
born of that marriage, Randall, presently age 13, 
Richard, age 11, and twins, Bret and Bart, age 8. 
In 1961, difficulties arose in the marriage. During 
that time, the father admits striking the mother and she 
was either knocked down or she slipped and fell down, 
and also admits beating the children with clothes 
hangers (R. 133). The father admits that he knew his 
actions were upsetting to the mother, and that he also 
made repeated threats to take her children from her, 
knowing that it was terribly upsetting to her (R. 135 ). 
A divorce was granted to the mother July 21, 1964, 
on the grounds of mental cruelty, and it was found by 
the court that the father had treated her cruelly, had 
become unaffectionate toward her, had told her he no 
longer loved her, had refused to live with her, and this 
had been caused by no fault of hers. In spite of the 
fact that the father had been repeatedly requested to 
discontinued such conduct he refused to do so (R. 8). 
Prior to the divorce, the father and his new wife were 
working at the same place and frequently he would pick 
her up on 21st South Street and take her to work 
(R. 104). 
2 
The new Mrs. Stone was divorced in 1963 and has 
three children, two girls, age 13 and 7, and a boy age 9. 
Iu April, 1965, the father married the new wife and took 
on the obligations of her three chlidren. He admits that 
from that time on, he never offered to help his ex-wife 
in the raising of his children, except for the payment of 
support (R. 137). 
The father brought this action less than a year after 
his new marriage, and alleges that the mother is men-
tally ill. He admitted, however, on cross-examination, 
that he knew that she had a physical problem all of the 
time ( R. 137). He knew that his wife had been examined 
by her family doctor and was told that she had a blood 
sugar problem called hypoglycemia. Hypoglycemia is 
an abnormally diminished content of glucose in the blood, 
giving the same general symptoms associated with sugar 
diabetes (R. 187-9). The father testified that he knew 
that the mother was taking pills for the problem, and 
had told him that she was feeling much better prior to 
his filing the action (R. 137). 
The father admits that the mother has done a good 
job in caring for the children. He did not contest the 
divorce or attempt to obtain custody of the children at 
that time. The father further stated on cross-examina-
tion that the mother was doing a good job raising the 
children until approximately September 1965 (R. 146-7). 
He further stated that since the action was initiated in 
l\Iarch 1966, she has been doing a real job (R. 146). The 
only period the father complains about is the Fall of 
Hl65 and January and February 1966 (R. 147). He 
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further admitted that the children were <loing well in 
school, that they were active in Sunday School and Scout 
activities, and that he knew the mother had taken the 
children two or three times a week on picnics to the park, 
and swimming, and had gone fishing and camping over 
night on several occasions with them (R. 146). 
Though the father claims that the mother was men-
tally incompetent from September 1965, to January 1966, 
the evidence in no way substantiated this claim. After 
Dr. Anderson diagnosed her problem as hypoglycemia 
and prescribed drugs, the temporary difficulty of the 
mother was corrected. All of the witnesses, both medical 
and neighbors, testified that the children were properly 
cared for and never neglected by the mother. Dr. Jack 
Tedro, a physician and surgeon, specializing in psy-
chiatry, testified that a person with hypoglycemia would 
not be able to recognize members of his own family at 
times, and that a person could believe that he had a 
tape recorder in his head and still do a pretty good job 
with the family without having the children suffer under 
these conditions (R. 191-3). Dr. Tedro further testified 
that the mother had done a worthwhile job with the 
children in the last six years, and it would be very dis-
turbing to her if the children were taken from her 
(R. 200). Dr. Tedro never at any time said that Mrs. 
Stone had schizophrenia as represented in appellant's 
brief, nor is there any evidence showing that he recom-
mended hospitalization in the L.D.S. Hospital psychiatric 
ward as appellant has claimed. 
Four neighbors substantiate the fact that the chil-
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dren were never neglected by their mother. Mrs. 
l\Iarjorie .Tones, a neighbor of six years, testified that 
only once did the mother state to her that she had a 
difficult time with the children, and that she could think 
out things clearly, that the only difficult period was 
between October 1965 to February 1966. She further 
testified that prior to that time, things were perfectly 
11ormal, and since February, the mother appeared per-
fectly normal. She further testified that the children 
always apeared to be normal, well dressed, well fed, 
clean, well adjusted in the neighborhood, and active in 
church and scout work (R. 170-172). 
Mr. Teddy Jones testified that he had lived right 
next door to the mother for six years, that he had ob-
served the children, and that they were not in any way 
different from any other children in the neighborhood, 
that they were well clothed and clean (R. 177). 
Jeanine Snider, a neighbor of five years, testified 
that the mother had done an excellent job with the chil-
dren. She testified that she was aware that Carol had 
had a diabetic problem during October 1965 to March 
1966, and that she was taking pills for this problem. She 
observed that the children were not hungry, that they 
were properly dressed, ~well adjusted, clean, and not 
dirtier than any other children in the neighborhood. She 
also testified that she knew they were active in church 
and considered Mrs. Stone a good mother (R. 182-5). 
Madelon Close, also a neighbor of six years, who 
had lived directly across the street from the mother 
testified that the onlv difficulty she observed was from 
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October 1965 to January 1966, and that she had been 
much better since January 1966. She further testified 
that the children were dressed like all other children in 
the neighborhood, and that she had never observed the 
children being hungry or neglected in any way (R. 161). 
All of the children testified concerning the fine care 
they received from their mother. Randall, age 13, testi-
fied that he knew his mother loved him, that she fed him 
well, and that he had a good breakfast, lunch and dinner 
every day (R. 215). Ricky, age 11, stated that his mother 
had taken them swimming and fishing many times, and 
that his mother stays home and takes care of him 
( R. 218-20). The two younger children, age 7, also testi-
fied that their mother fed them well, kept them clean, 
and washed them (R. 222-3). 
In spite of the excellent care given to these children, 
the father requested the court to grant him custody of 
his four sons and place them in a new home with limited 
supervision. The father's new wife testified that she 
had worked continuously since high school, and that her 
children had been cared for five days a week in nursery 
schools, or by someone coming into the home and caring 
for them (R. 89). She further testified that her seYen-
year old child had not been living in her home from 
January until June, 1966, and gave the reason as an 
illness she had in January (R. 91). Her mother had 
taken the child to ease her work load (R. 96). The child 
was enrolled in school in Pleasant Grove in .Jan nary am! 
remained there the rest of the year (R. 95). The new 
wife, however, continued to work, having lost only one 
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week from her employment at Litton Industries for the 
illness. The new wife testified that she was presently 
alowing her 13-year-old daughter to tend her children 
at home, and this notwithstanding the fact that she and 
her husband leave for work at 7 :15 A.M. and do not 
return until after 4 :30 P.M. (R. 90). This required the 
children to get themselves ready for school, prepare 
their own breakfast and go to school without the aid of 
either parent, and return without their parents being 
home (R. 90). The new Mrs. Stone also testified that 
she had been nervous prior to her marriage with Mr. 
Stone and had sought medical attention for aches and 
pains in her points and hands the entire year proceeding 
the trial. She testified that she sought medical attention 
at least once a week for the past year (R. 96-99). The 
new Mrs. Stone also testified that she would have to 
continue to work indefinitely as she did now, and this 
in order to take care of present bills and obligations 
(R. 104). Her nine-year old child, Richard, also has a 
health problem and requires private tutoring (R. 92). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AFTER AN AW ARD OF CUSTODY IS 
MADE BY THE DIVORCE COURT, A 
CHILD UPON REACHING THE AGE OF 
TEN YEARS DOES NOT HA VE AN ABSO-
LUTE RIGHT TO CHANGE THE ORDER 
OF CUSTODY. 
The record in this case discloses that the two older 
boys, Randall, age 12, and Richard, age 11, while testi-
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fying that they loved their mother and that she took 
good care of them, indicated that they would prefer to 
live with their father because they hadn't seen him for 
so long and wanted to spend more time with him. Thus 
the legal question arises as to whether such preference 
is absolutely binding upon the trial court. This issue 
involves an interpretation of ~30-3-5 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953 which provides as follows: 
"When a decree of divorce is made the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of 
the parties and children, as may be equitable; 
provided, that if any of the children have at-
tained the age of 10 years and are of sound 
mind, such children shall have the privilege of 
selecting the parent to which they will attach 
themselves. Such subsequent changes or new 
orders may be made by the court with respect 
to the disposal of the children or the distribution 
of property as shall be reasonable and proper.'' 
Contrary to what appellant states in his brief, this 
is not a case of first impression in the State of Utah, the 
law already having been clearly decided, both in the case 
of an original divorce proceeding and in the case of a 
subsequent order for modification. 
With respect to the original decree, the court in a 
split decision in Smith vs. Smith, 15 Utah 2d 36, 386 
P.2d 900, found that it was obliged to construe the 
statute literally, and that the child's decision was bind· 
ing upon the court. 
With respect to a subsequent modification of the 
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deC'ree, which is the case here, the court in the case of 
Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132, also 
interpreted the statute literally and held that the decision 
of the child is not absolutely binding upon the trial court. 
In so holding, the court stated as follows: 
''The italicized portion thereof, as set out herein-
above, is a limitation on the power of the court to 
award custody of a child 'at the time the decree 
is made' to a parent not of the child's choice, 
where both parents are found to be fit to have 
such custody. The proviso modifies the first por-
tion of the sentence of which it is a part. As to 
change of custody subsequent to the decree, the 
statute states that orders relative thereto shall 
be dictated by what is 'reasonable and proper'." 
Not only would the position of appellant herein require 
an over-ruling of the Anderson vs. Anderson case, but 
such position is contrary to good reason and common 
sense. Justice Crockett in his dissenting opinion in the 
Smith vs. Smith case, supra, makes the following com-
ment: 
"Under such a rule, parents already too deeply 
immersed in woes because the family is breaking 
up would have them added to by having to com-
pete with each other for the children's choice. 
Without elaborating thereon it is easy to see the 
hazzards to them and to the child this would 
create. Such a battle might well go to the more 
unscrupulous parent, who may not be above 
poisoning the child's mind against the other; or 
resorting to C'oercion; or showering him with ill-
advised gifts or favors. Even more damaging 
would be the subjecting of a child to such pres-
sures and making him a pawn in the contest of 
the spouses for his custody. It is extremely doubt-
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ful that under tmch circumstances a child of that 
age would have the stability and judgment to see 
through the maze of troubles and make a wise 
choice. In some instances it would be cruel to 
subject him to it and wholly unrealistic to regard 
his choice as absolute.'' 
The dangers that Justice Crockett refers to are far more 
real and apparent in the change of custody case than in 
the case of the original divorce. At least in the latter, 
once the decision is made, the parties can accept it and 
live with it, while in the former, the child would in many 
cases be under constant pressure from either one parent 
or the other to change his mind. It would be cruel in-
deed to place a child in such a position. 
Often it is necessary to discipline a child; or to 
deprive a child of something he desires; or require the 
child to do things in the furtherance of his education 
which the child does not wish to do. In these matters a 
child under the law has a duty to obey his parents. Cer-
tainly it is not in the best interests of either society or 
the child to put an immature 10-year-old child in such 
a position that he can be absolutely relieved of his duties 
and obligations to a parent upon his own choice, or that 
he be placed in a position where he can use that choice 
as a threat against a well-meaning parent to make de-
mands upon the parent, or to be relieved of unpleasant 
responsibilities which would otherwise be for his best 
good. 
There is no reason for the Anderson vs. Anderson 
case to be over-ruled. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO CHANGE 
THE ORDER OF CUSTODY. 
This court has held on many occasions that the 
paramount consideration in determining the question of 
custody of children is the welfare of the children; fur-
ther, that the trial court has broad discretion in making 
that determination, and its ruling will not be upset unless 
there is plain abuse. Walton vs. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 
169 P.2d 97; Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 
P.2d 132; Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550; 
Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P.2d 283; Steiger vs. 
8teiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418; Johnson vs. John-
son, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d 16; Briggs vs. Briggs, 111 
Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223. 
As is documented by the statement of facts herein, 
the witnesses overwhelmingly testified that Mrs. Stone 
was a good mother; that she took excellent care of the 
children; and that the children were all well-adjusted in 
their school, church and other activities. Because of the 
overwhelming nature of this testimony from appellant's 
own witnesses, respondent found it unnecessary to put 
on further testimony, and rested her case without calling 
any further witnesses. 
It is understandable why the trial court found that 
it was in the best interests of the four minor children 
that they remain under the fine care and supervision 
they had received from their mother, who spends her 
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entire time in the care of the chilclren. Particularly is 
this understandable ·when the alternative would be to 
place the children in the home of a step-mother who iR 
employed and away from her home during the day, 
thereby leaving the boys, some of which are in their 
early teens, in the unwholesome position of being left 
alone ·with children of the step-mother, among which are 
girls of their own age. While respondent does not ·wish 
to question the integrity or the moral character of ~Ir. 
Stone or his new wife, nevertheless it would seem unwise 
to remove the children from a home in -vvhich they are 
well-adjusted and well cared for, and place them in a 
home where their future adjustment is an unknown 
factor. 
It is true that a mother has no absolute right to the 
custody of minor children. However, this court has held 
on numerous occasions that in the absence of a showing 
that the mother is immoral or unfit, and all other things 
being equal, preference should be given the mother in 
awarding custody. Johnson vs. Johnson., 7 Utah 2d 263, 
323 P.2d 16; Steiger vs. Steiger, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2J 
418; Cooke vs. Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 Pac. 83; Briggs vs. 
Briggs, 111 Utah 418, 181 P.2d 223. Appellant has madr 
no showing whatsoever which would rebut this pre-
sumption in favor of the mother, or otherwise shown that 
the trial court abused its discretion. The bold claim of 
mental incompetency of the mother is absolutely un-
supported by the evidence, and respondent would invite 
the court to carefully scrutinize the record in this regard. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE RE-
SPONDENT TO SUBMIT TO A MENTAL 
EXAMINATION. 
Appellant in this case insisted on going to trial as 
soon as posible, and the pre-trial order (R. 35) was 
drafted in such a manner so as to set forth as issues for 
the trial (1) whether the plaintiff was unfit to retain 
custody of the children, and (2) whether the plaintiff 
should be required to submit to a mental examination 
under Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant 
then was willing to proceed to trial on the merits, and 
the question of the mother's fitness was fully litigated. 
The appellant now, after having had his day in court, 
says that the trial court should have ordered a mental 
examination. He is thus placing the trial judge in the 
rather strange position of having to rule on a question 
involving pre-trial discovery after the case is all over. 
Never at any time prior to the trial was the preliminary 
issue noticed for hearing, and the appellant is now simply 
attempting to get two shots at his case. 
Even though appellant has had his day in court, the 
trial court did not preclude a future mental examination. 
'fhe trial court in its memorandum decision (R. 46) after 
having found that there was no evidence to show that 
plaintiff was mentally incompetent or otherwise unfit, 
stated that if it appears at some future time that a 
psychiatric or physical examination is necessary, applica-
tion for the same could be made to the court. Thus the 
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door was left open, and it is difficult to see how the trial 
judge could have been more fair to the appellant. 
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
the court "may" order a party to submit to a mental or 
physical examination ''only on a motion for good cause 
shown.'' Cases construing the identical Federal rule 
have unanimously held that the granting or denying of 
such a motion is a matter which lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany of Piterto Rico vs. Negron Torres, 255 F.2d 149; 
Butcher vs. Crause, 200 F.2d 576; Teche Lines vs. Boy-
ette, 111 F.2d 579; The Italia, 27 F.Supp. 785. There is 
no showing in this case of any abuse of the trial court's 
discretion. 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT 
MADE SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT 
DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF 
DEFENDANT. 
Appellant complains because the trial court did not 
make findings of fact as specific as appellant would like 
to have had them. This does not prejudice his case in 
any manner whatsoever. Where the same objection was 
raised in the case of Cawley vs. Cawley, 59 Utah 80, 202 
Pac. 10, the court stated as follows: 
''Plaintiff, however, insists that the District 
Court erred in not making specific findings re-
specting the charges in his complaint. It is true 
that the court omitted to make specific findings, 
and merely found that the statements contained 
in the complaint were untrue, and upon that find-
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ing dismissed the complaint; yet it is also true 
that, in view of the fact that divorce proceedings 
are highly equitable, in equity cases, where the 
evidence is all certified to this court, as was done 
in this case, we may make findings or direct what 
they shall be, or in case the findings are insuf-
ficient or incomplete, make them conform to the 
evidence. In view, therefore, that under the 
evidence in this case the findings would neces-
sarily have to be against the plaintiff, he was not, 
nor could he have been, prejudiced by the omis-
sion of the court to make specific findings.'' 
If the court sees any merit to requiring detailed findings 
of fact, the trial court can be required to amend them 
accordingly. However, in light of the fact that the entire 
record is before the court, it is difficult to see what 
purpose this would accomplish. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
ERROR IN REFUSING TO FIND THE 
MOTHER IN CONTEMPT, NOR DID IT RE-
FUSE THE FATHER REASONABLE VISI-
TATION RIGHTS. 
The original Divorce Decree of the parties gave the 
father "reasonable" rights of visitation (R. 5). Ap-
pellant complains that he was refused visitation privi-
leges on Wednesday evenings, and that such refusal 
constitutes contempt of court on the part of the mother. 
There was never an order granting the father visitation 
privileges on Wednesday evenings, and in the absence 
of a showing that appellant was deprived of "reason-
ahle" visitation privileges, there is no basis for con -
tempt. 
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The decree of the trial court expandPd defendant's 
privileges to include eYery other weekend, two >Yeeks in 
the summertime, plus additional visitation privileges at 
times convenient to the children and the parties (R. 59). 
It is difficult to understand how this can be considered 
as "limited" visitation rights and an ahuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
When one examines the complete record in this case, 
it can readily be seen that the trial judge exercised wis-
dom in his discretion in refusing to change the order of 
custody to the father. The decision simply is not the 
result of an unsavory collusion on the part of a preju-
diced trial judge and a plaintiff's attorney who resorts 
to "brainwashing" tactics as appellant has implied in his 
brief and would have this court believe. 
Based upon all of the arguments and authorities as 
cited herein, respondent respectfully requests that the 
decision of the trial court be affirmed. 
Respondent further requests that she be allowed 
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